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ARTICLE

Standing our Ground:
A Study of Southeast Asian Counterterrorism Conventions
Contributing to a Peaceful Existence
Major Dennis Hager
ABSTRACT
Less than a year after the September 11th attacks on New York and
Washington D.C., terrorist groups in Southeast Asia carried out a number of high
profile attacks in the region. In an area ripe for global terrorism the effects of
counter‐terrorism conventions can be measured and the possibility of progress
in the global war observed. The regional cooperation inherent in these
conventions has been crucial to the success of peace for this region, and is
especially significant considering the immense cultural and political differences
among these nations.
With fourteen official languages and over 500 million people living in an
area that spans the entire economic, religious, and political spectrum, Southeast
Asia may very well epitomize the definition of regional diversity. They have a
style very different from that of the European Union, but one that may be
applicable in Africa, Latin America, or the Middle East.
Maintaining a focus on sovereignty does not equate to a lack of regional
or international cooperation. Contrary to some western views this region has
proven to be flexible and effective in countering terrorist threats. As terrorists
continue to evolve, Southeast Asia is prepared to evolve in ways that will counter
new threats.



Major Dennis L. Hager II is an active duty Marine and the Staff Judge Advocate for U.S.
Marine Forces, South in Miami, Florida. Major Hager served in the Pacific as the Staff
Judge Advocate for the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit and as the Foreign Jurisdiction
Officer for Marine Forces Japan. The positions and opinions in this article are those of
the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the United States Government,
the Department of Defense, or the United States Marine Corps.
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I. INTRODUCTION

From July 2007 through June 2008, I had the honor of travelling
throughout Southeast Asia as the Civil Military Operations Officer and Staff Judge
Advocate of a Marine Expeditionary Unit. A major aspect of my job was the
coordination between host nation governments, local leadership, Department of
State Personnel, Non‐government organizations, my military unit planners and
leadership. I was able to visit Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, and Timor Leste (nine of the twelve nations of
Southeast Asia). Firsthand, I observed some of the counter terrorism training
taking place in many of these nations and, after further study, determined that
the region is an emerging cooperative force in the global war against terrorism.
This emergent anti‐terrorism cooperative behavior, which involves multiple
cultures and nations, has helped shape the battlefield in favor of current national
governments in Southeast Asia.
Less than a year after the September 11th attacks on New York and
Washington D.C., terrorist groups in Southeast Asia carried out a number of high
profile attacks against westerners in the region. The most infamous of these
attacks was the October 2002 Bali bombing that killed 202 people.1 Since 2002,
cooperative anti terrorism efforts have significantly impacted terrorist activities.
In an area ripe for global terrorism the effects of these counter‐terrorism
conventions can be measured and the possibility of progress in the global war
observed. The regional cooperation inherent in these conventions has been
crucial to the success of peace for this region, and is especially significant
considering the immense cultural and political differences among these nations.
As the global fight against terrorism continues to evolve, Southeast Asia has
become a model of counterterrorism law and regional cooperation in a region
where multiple sovereign interests reign.
A. A Region of Diversity
With over 500 million people living in an area spanning multiple
economic standings, religions, opposing political ideologies and fourteen official
languages, Southeast Asia may very well epitomize the definition of regional
diversity.2 In order to understand how regional security has developed in this
1

Bali death toll set at 202, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia‐
pacific/2778923.stm (last updated Feb. 19, 2003, 9:42 AM).
2
See generally East & Southeast Asia, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY [CIA], THE WORLD
FACTBOOK,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the‐world‐
factbook/wfbExt/region_eas.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2011) (noting that there are over
30 languages listed as spoken in the region including some indigenous languages that
are just now being studied); ASEAN Member States, ASS’N OF SE. ASIAN NATIONS [ASEAN],
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part of the world and why it works using a significantly different mechanism than
the rest of the world, you have to first acknowledge this diversity and the
historical events which shaped it.
1. Economic Variety
Economically, the region is home to Brunei Darussalam and Singapore,
which have the world’s fourth and fifth highest gross national product (GNP),
while at the same time being home to some of the world’s lowest GNP’s in
Burma and Cambodia.3 The economic development of these countries is
dramatically diverse along similar lines with Burma, Timor Leste, and Cambodia
being listed in a group considered the least developed countries in the world
while Singapore is singled out as one of the foremost modern economies.4 Even
with the significantly advanced and strong economies of Brunei Darussalam and
Singapore, the average unemployment rate in Southeast Asia is over thirty
percent.5 This, combined with the low GNP for the majority of the nations,
makes economic advancement the primary focus of most nations in Southeast
Asia.6 One of the key enabling factors for terrorism in Southeast Asia is poverty;
therefore any effort to counter terrorism in this region has to be complimented
by efforts to address the economic shortfalls.

http://www.aseansec.org/18619.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2011) (listing thirteen official
languages).
3
See generally Country Information Reports INTN’L MONETARY FUND,
http://www.imf.org/external/country/index.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2011); Date and
Research, THE WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2011);
Country
Comparison:
GDP
Per
Capita, CIA, THE
WORLD
FACTBOOK,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the‐world‐factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html
(last visited Mar. 11, 2011) (providing statistics that came from a list of nations sorted by
their gross domestic product at purchasing power parity per capita and the value of
goods and services produced within a nation in a given year divided by the average
population for the same year).
4
See Least Developed Countries: Country Profiles, U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE
FOR THE LEAST DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, LANDLOCKED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES & SMALL ISLAND
DEVELOPING STATES, http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/related/62/ (last visited Apr. 11,
2011) (providing economic information on each country); Singapore, UN‐OHRLLS,
http://www.unohrlls.org/en/orphan/134/ (last updated June, 2008) (stating that the
“per capita GDP [is] equal to that of the leading nations of Western Europe).
5
See Country Comparison: Unemployment Rate, CIA, THE WORLD FACTBOOK,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the‐world‐factbook/rankorder/2129rank.html
(last visited Apr. 11, 2011) (providing an average of all rates of unemployment).
6
See
ASEAN
Vision
2020,
Kuala
Lumpur
(Dec.
15,
1997),
http://www.aseansec.org/1814.htm (outlining achievable goals by ASEAN by 2020).
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The global economic importance of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore,
which connect the Pacific Ocean to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf,
cannot be overstated. Currently, over 15 million barrels of oil are transported
every day through the Straits and, by 2015 this region is projected to be a single
market of 550 million people.7 It is one of the top five export markets for the U.S.
and its economy is growing rapidly with $100 billion in American private sector
dollars invested in the region.8 A significant indicator of the importance of a
stable economy in the Southeast Asian region to the U.S. is the $554,400,000.00
in regional assistance that was budgeted by the U.S. government in 2008.9
2. Religious Ideology
Religions in Southeast Asia cover almost the entire spectrum of global
religious ideologies. They differ in significance from nation to nation both in
their effect on internal legislation and in the religious influence and teachings of
specific groups within each state. Indonesia holds the world’s largest Muslim
population and the Philippines have one of the world’s largest Christian
populations, while Thailand and Cambodia are predominantly Buddhist.10 In
Singapore religion seems to have little if any significance at all on the population
while in the southern Philippine island of Mindanao it has been a reason for over
a hundred years of fighting.11 Religious institutions play a major civic role in
some cases, such as the Buddhist monks in Burma who were the primary if not
one of the only resources for distribution of food and water to the victims of
Typhoon Nargis.12 They also have historical influence in the region; Buddhism on
the mainland, the Muslim missionaries from the 14th century in the islands and
Christian missionaries from the 17th century in the Philippines remain relevant in
those cultures today.13 In a region where nations are very aware of their
7

Scot A. Marciel, U.S. Ambassador for ASEAN Affairs & Deputy Assistant Sec’y for E.
Asian & Pac. Affairs, Remarks to the Center for Strategic International Studies Meeting
on “U.S. and Southeast Asia: Toward a Strategy for Enhanced Engagement” (Sept. 25,
2008).
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
East
&
Southeast
Asia,
CIA,
THE
WORLD
FACTBOOK,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the‐world‐factbook/wfbExt/region_eas.html
(last visited Apr. 11, 2011).
11
See Li‐ann Thio, Constitutional Accommodation of the Rights of Ethnic and Religious
Minorities in Plural Democracies: Lessons and Cautionary Tales from South‐East Asia, 22
PACE INT'L L. REV. 43, 51–53 (2010) (discussing the Minanao conflict).
12
Dennis Hager, Typhoon Nargis Notes from the Andaman Sea (May 25, 2008)
(describing personal experiences during the relief effort in Burma) (on file with author).
13
Univ. of Cumbria Div. of Religion and Philosophy, South‐East Asian Religions, PHILTAR,
http://www.philtar.ac.uk/encyclopedia/seasia/index.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2011)
(providing an overview of world religions).
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sovereign rights and suspicious of outside influences, Christianity from the West
and Wahabism from Middle East are still major influences which often shape
events on national, regional, and especially local levels. Important to this paper
is the thought that; the ideologies that support terrorism in Southeast Asia are
attributed primarily to the influence of extreme Salafi notions of jihad emanating
from the Middle East and the historical violence of Islamic extremist groups in
Indonesia and the Southern Philippines.14
3. Political Differences
The political ideologies of Southeast Asia vary from the strict military
regime in Burma, to the Communists of Vietnam and Laos, and from the differing
forms of democracy in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, to the United
Nations supervised governments in Cambodia and Timor Leste.15 Some of these
countries such as Vietnam, Laos, and Burma constitutionally only allow for a
single political party, while other countries have several options, such as
Thailand where there are ten parties to choose from during an election.16
B. Post Colonial Sovereignty
For the last century Southeast Asians have struggled to recover from
colonial domination and form their own respective sovereign identities. In the
16th, 17th and 18th centuries Great Britain, France, Spain, and Portugal colonized
all of Southeast Asia except for Thailand.17 Although there were some struggles
for independence in the 1930’s it was not until after World War II when the
Japanese attempted regional domination that most of the colonial rule began to
dissolve.18 With the end of the war, communism spread down into the region
from China.19 The ideology of communism was met by resistance supported by
the United States, and an era of struggle continued in the region until the
conclusion of the cold war.20 The colonial experience led to a regional obsession
to preserve state sovereignty and created a propensity for avoidance of both

14

Xinsheng Wang, Dir., Zhongshan Univ. Ctr. for Asia‐Pacific Studies, Lecture to UCLA
Center for Southeast Asian Studies (May 13, 2004) (transcript on file with author).
15
See generally CIA, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the‐
world‐factbook/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2011) (profiling these countries and giving
information on the form of government used in each).
16
Id.
17
See generally PETER CHURCH, A SHORT HISTORY OF SOUTH‐EAST ASIA (Peter Church ed., John
Wiley & Sons 5th ed. 2009) (2003) (summarizing the history of each country in South‐
east Asia).
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
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international law and its institutions.21 Consequently the region does not follow
the models of international law that have become standard in the West and this
causes some outsiders to view Southeast Asia as a loosely tied group of states
focused on sovereignty of their individual states over the regional/global issues
of the group.22 Southeast Asian states prefer informal processes, modest
institutionalization, and relations with non‐state actors such as the private
sector.23 While these types of relationships as law are in contradiction to
western structures and arrangements, they are necessary when developing any
type of legal relationships in Southeast Asia.24 This fear of infringement on their
sovereignty by foreigners is a central concept to Southeast Asian states regional
agreements.25 It is a concept that makes it seem complicated to form any type
of working regional entity and for many Westerners to understand if and when it
works.26 Hesitance extends not only to the traditional outside nations that have
colonized the region, but also to the thought of regionalization itself. Southeast
Asians are tentative about entering into any kind of relationship; however, they
have come to a realization that successful and effective cooperation and
integration are essential to prevent terrorists from manipulating their region.27
C. The ASEAN Way
In 1967, after several attempts at regional unification had failed, the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was formed.28 During a time
21

See Valeriane Toon, International Criminal Court: Reservations of Non‐State Parties in
Southeast Asia, 26 CONTEMP. SOUTHEAST ASIA 218, 219–226 (2004) (discussing Southeast
Asia’s opposition to the ICC and the two common themes of pre‐eminence of state
sovereignty and sustencanc eof regimes).
22
See Eric Stein, International Integration and Democracy: No Love at First Sight, 95 AM.
J. INT’L L. 489, 495 (2001) (noting the difficulties that ASEAN has faced because oyoung
nations in particularf disputes among its members and the organization’s failure to
respond to problems).
23
YOSHI KODAMA, ASIA PACIFIC ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND THE GATT‐WTO REGIME 96 (2000).
24
See id. at 97, 118–119 (noting that these characteristics were necessary “in order to
achieve ASEAN’s co‐operation”).
25
See id. at 96 (discussing the efforts in making the regional arrangement to reduce the
concern amongst ASEAN members regarding domination by foreign powers).
26
See Megan R. Williams, Note, ASEAN: Do Progress and Effectiveness Require a
Judiciary?, 30 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 433, 452–457 (2007) (arguing that ASEAN needs
to change it’s tradition of “sovereignty above all else” if it wishes to be an effective
organization).
27
See 28th ASEAN Chiefs of Police Conference, Brunei, May 25–29, 2008, Joint
Communiqué, ¶ 11, 12, http://www.aseansec.org/21619.htm (stating that ASEAN
recognizes the need for cooperation in order to achieve its goals).
28
Williams, supra note 26, at 435; see also Wahjudi Widajanto, The Future of ASEAN
After the Financial and Economic Crisis in the Region, in 2003 SHEDDEN PAPERS 82, 82–84,
available
at
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when many Southeast Asian Nations were still emerging from the yoke of
colonialism and evolving into their own sovereign identities it was not an easy
step to enter into a collective organization that stripped some of that identity.
Fortunately, the founding members of ASEAN recognized that the Superpowers
of the cold war were vying for influence in the area and that successful and
effective cooperation and integration would be essential to prevent the rest of
the world from manipulating their region.29 The founders did not want this to be
seen as a military alliance or an attempt at a third superpower, so they made it
clear that this was not a military alliance, but an organization for cooperation
and economic prosperity in Southeast Asia.30 That, notwithstanding the fear of
communist influence, was significant motivation for the five original members
(Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore) to consolidate in
some way.31
ASEAN functions with one institutional body, the Secretariat, which
facilitates discussions between representatives. The position of Chairman rotates
each year between the member nations on an alphabetical basis.32 Beyond this
basic organizational structure however ASEAN is unique. Anti‐neocolonialism
and sovereignty are at the center of a thought process that creates a challenge
for the introduction of any Western style binding legal structure.33 This may be
in part because Southeast Asia has its own cultural identity, and although these
nations were colonized for over a century there is an underlying cultural heritage
native to the region. Culturally, most people in the region reconcile differences
through negotiation and accommodation rather than adjudication.34 It would
make no sense to try and put a square peg into a round hole by trying to force
western style agreements on Southeast Asian nations; thus, the creation of a
concept titled the “ASEAN Way.” The “ASEAN Way” is defined as a pledged
commitment to consultation as the basis for settling differences among the
http://www.defence.gov.au/adc/docs/Publications/Shedden%20Papers%202003/Col_
Widajanto.pdf (discussing past failed attempts at regional organization).
29
See Williams, supra note 26, at 440 (stating that the fear of the spread of communism
to the region was one driving force in the creation of ASEAN, and that its goal was the
eventual integration of all of Southeast Asia).
30
See The ASEAN Declaration, Aug. 8, 1967, 6 I.L.M. 1233 (citing objectives and member
states: Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore).
31
KODAMA, supra note 20, at 86.
32
The
ASEAN
Charter
art.
31,
Nov.
20,
2007,
http://www.aseansec.org/publications/ASEAN‐Charter.pdf.
33
See Hisashi Owada, The Experience of Asia with International Adjudication, 9
SING.Y.B.INT’L.L. 9, 9–10 (2005) (describing the cultural development of the Southeast
Asian region).
34
Id. at 14 (“Some of those arrested in Cambodia were Thai nationals, or in Thailand
were Malaysian nationals, or in the Philippines and Singapore were Indonesian
nationals.”).
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ASEAN members while maintaining observance to a principle of
noninterference.35 While many of the western forms of regional partnership
seem to erode sovereignty, ASEAN prides itself on the reinforcement of the
sovereign nation status.36
The “ASEAN Way” has proven efficient in the region when dealing with
transnational issues including the threats of Communism and colonial
domination. Today there is a new challenge to ASEAN in the global threat of
terrorism. In 2002–2003, actions were taken against terrorists operating in
ASEAN countries such as Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore, and Thailand.37 A number of those arrested in each country were
nationals of other ASEAN member countries. Terrorists have taken their trade
outside of sovereign borders and created an environment requiring regional
action. The response has been an evolution of the “ASEAN Way” to incorporate
partnerships both regionally and internationally while striving to maintain their
ethos of sovereignty.
D. Terrorism Defined
In the post 9‐11 world a global emphasis has been put on countering
terrorism, yet the definition of the term terrorism is just as elusive as the
terrorists themselves. Terrorism is defined differently in domestic legislation,
regional organizations, and the United Nation Conventions.38 Authority for the
Security Council to take action against terrorists is provided under the United
Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1566,39 but its definition of
"terrorism" is still evasive. While efforts continue to create a comprehensive
international treaty in the UN that defines terrorism, ASEAN has agreed to a
35

Gillian Goh, The “ASEAN Way”: Non‐Intervention and ASEAN’s Role in Conflict
Management, 3 STAN. J. E. ASIAN AFF. 113, 114 (Spring 2003).
36
Tom Ginsberg, The State of Sovereignty in Southeast Asia, 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L LEGAL
PROC. 419, 420 (2005) (A presentation for the ninety‐ninth annual meeting of the
American Society of International Law).
37
Gregory Rose & Diana Nestorovska, Towards an ASEAN Counter‐Terrorism Treaty, 9
S.Y.B.I.L. 157, 166 (2005).
38
Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2007) (defining terrorism in the United States as the
unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a
government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political
or social objectives), with S.C. Res. 1566, ¶3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566 (Oct. 8, 2004)
(describing the United Nations definition of terrorism as, criminal acts, including against
civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of
hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a
group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government
or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act).
39
S.C. Res. 1566, supra note 38, ¶ 2.
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definition in their counter terrorism convention. The ASEAN definition is a
compilation of the thirteen UN counter terrorism conventions definitions
referring to terrorist acts.40 Getting over the hurdle of agreeing on a definition of
terrorism was a good start; however, counterterrorism entails more than just
defining a term, it also requires an understanding of the roots of terrorism.
Confucius stated, “From the Emperor down to the masses of the people, all must
consider the cultivation of the person the root of everything else.”41 Significant
factors in Southeast Asia that have created an especially strong soil for the roots
of terrorism are the social environment and a loosely regulated financial
market.42 A social environment of extreme poverty, extensive rural areas, and
minimal education give terrorist recruiters a captive audience for their ideological
prose.43 In addition, a business friendly environment with poor regulations
makes the region an attractive resource for money laundering.44
Terrorism has been a major problem for many Southeast Asian nations
for decades.45 Southeast Asia is home to numerous Muslim separatist groups
that have expanded their activities to other parts of the globe.46 Jemaah
Islamiyya (“JI”),47 Moro Islamic Liberation Front (“MILF”),48 and Abu Sayyaf
(“ASG”),49 who have all carried out terrorist attacks against their host nation
40

Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN], Convention on Counter Terrorism,
art. II, ¶1 (Jan. 13, 2004) [hereinafter ASEAN Convention], available at
http://www.aseansec.org/19250.htm.
41
Gillian Triggs, Confucius and Consensus: International Law in the Asian Pacific, 21
MELB. U. L. REV. 650, 650 (1997).
42
Paul Smith & Terry Klapakis, ASIA‐PACIFIC CENTER FOR SECURITY STUDIES, EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY: COUNTERING THE SUPPORT ENVIRONMENT FOR TERRORISM IN THE ASIA‐PACIFIC REGION
(2006),
http://www.apcss.org/college/conference/countering‐the‐support‐
environment‐for‐terrorism‐in‐the‐asia‐pacific‐region/.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
MARK MANYIN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31672, TERRORISM IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (2004),
available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/35795.pdf.
46
Simon
Elegant,
Dire
Straits,
TIME,
Nov.
29,
2004,
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,501041206‐832306,00.html.
47
See MANYIN, supra note 45, at 4–12 (describing JI as a militant Islamist group active in
several Southeast Asian countries, especially Indonesia, founded in the 1960s by
Indonesian’s Abu Bakar Baasyir and Abdullah Sungkar, with the goal to create an Islamic
state comprising Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the southern Philippines).
48
Id. at 18 (describing MILF as Philippine organization with political objective of
separation and independence for the Muslim region of the southern Philippines and
linking MILF to the February 24, 2000, explosion of two buses aboard a ferry in the
Philippines, also expressing suspicion that JI terrorists have trained at MILF camps in the
Philippines).
49
See LARRY NIKSCH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31265, ABU SAYYAF: TARGET OF PHILIPPINE‐U.S.
ANTI‐TERRORISM
COOPERATION
(2002),
available
at
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governments as part of Islamic separatist movements, have become associated
with terrorist external to the region.50 Once considered merely a regional threat,
recent intelligence has exposed links between some of these regional groups and
Al Qaeda, proving that the threat goes beyond traditional anti‐government
attacks.51 The strategy for Al‐Qaeda and other global terrorist organizations has
been to attack tourist areas with less security when individual nations institute
greater security measures at political, diplomatic, and military facilities.52 The JI
bombings of a Bali nightclub in October 200253 and an Indonesian JW Marriot
hotel in August 200354 are evidence that Southeast Asian terrorists are in sync
with global terrorist strategies.
Combining the economic significance that Southeast Asia has on the
world’s economy with the potential for home grown terrorists, it is only logical
that Al‐Qaeda will expand its efforts in the region. Of particular concern is the
massive number of potential maritime targets in the Straits of Malacca. This is a
very real concern, as Al Qaeda plans strategically over a very long time and
attacks a wide variety of targets. The successful attack against a US Navy
Destroyer in Aden provides grim evidence of the possibility of future maritime
terrorist act in Southeast Asia and is of significant concern for shipping in the
Strait of Malacca. 55
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/8046.pdf (describing ASG as a splinter
group composed of former Moro National Liberation Front fighters and Filipinos who
had fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan, responsible for numerous attacks against
Filipino and American targets, including May 2000 kidnapping of three Americans, one
of which was executed); see also MANYIN, supra note 45, at 17–18 (discussing the
kidnappings carried out by ASG).
50
See generally MANYIN, supra note 45 (discussing terrorism in Southeast Asia).
51
See AUDREY KURTH CRONIN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 21529, AL QAEDA AFTER THE IRAQ
CONFLICT (2003), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21529.pdf (defining Al Qaeda
as an international terrorist organization led by Osama bin Laden, responsible for
numerous terrorist attacks including the September 11, 2001, attacks on New York City
and Washington, D.C., and attacks in Kenya, Indonesia, the Middle East, and the
Mediterranean); see also MANYIN, supra note 45, at 24 (discussing the attack on the USS
Cole).
52
Ambassador Francis X. Taylor, Coordinator for Counter‐terrorism of the U.S. State
Department, Address before the Energy Security Council, Apr 5, 2004, available at
http://2001‐2009.state.gov/m/ds/rls/rm/31917.htm.
53
See MANYIN, supra note 45, at 10 (describing the bombing that occurred in the resort
town of Kuta on the Indonesian Island of Bali where approximately 200 people were
killed and 300 were injured).
54
Islamist Group Appears to Claim Jakarta Blast, MSNBC (last updated Sept. 10, 2004,
7:41 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5947558/MSNBC.
55
Andrin Raj, The Straits of Malacca Under the Threat of a Maritime Terrorist Attack, THE
JOURNAL OF TURKISH WEEKLY (Mar. 24, 2010), http://www.turkishweekly.net/op‐
ed/2646/the‐straits‐of‐malacca‐under‐the‐threat‐of‐a‐maritime‐terrorist‐attack.html;
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II. COUNTERTERRORISM MECHANISMS
There is a simple formula that defines the terrorist threat in Southeast
Asia: hopeless poverty plus ideological promises for better situation through
violence equals terrorism. In order to counter this equation, the member states
of the region must not only bring violators of the law to task but must also
institute education that counters the ideological justification for terror and
mitigates poverty. The nations of ASEAN understand this process and are
addressing it through the adoption of the following international, regional, and
multilateral efforts.
A. UN Counterterrorism Conventions
After the events of September 11, 2001, an international framework was
developed in the United Nations for national legal changes related to anti‐
terrorism. Seventeen days after the attacks on New York and Washington D.C.
the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1373.56 Utilizing the
Council’s powers under Chapter VII, Resolution 1373 was based on a
determination that the attacks of September 11th constituted “a threat to
international peace and security.”57 By framing their resolution in this manner
the Security Council was able to direct member states to comply with their
program instead of just suggesting a course of action.58 What they directed was
that all states fight terrorism by criminalizing acts of terrorism, terrorist
enterprises, and any active or passive support to terrorists.59 Resolution 1373
requires all states to bring terrorists, terrorist financiers, planners, and
facilitators to justice.60 The resolution also calls on all states to create early
warning systems to screen for terrorists and share that information with other
states.61 To ensure that the provisions of Resolution 1373 were complied with, a
special monitoring body, the Counter‐Terrorism Committee (CTC), was set up.
Member states are required to report to CTC regarding their compliance with
the resolution.62
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In 2004, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1566,
which reinforced the provisions of Resolution 1373, called for an expansion to
the list of terrorist entities, and strengthened the United Nations position on
terrorism.63 Resolution 1566 also directed that nations cooperate with their
relevant regional organizations to facilitate the continued implementation of
Resolution 1373.64 ASEAN has embraced this task and views the United Nations
as playing a vital role in strengthening international cooperation to combat
global terrorism.65 As a regional organization, ASEAN stresses the importance of
its member nations meeting their obligations under United Nations Security
Resolution 1373 and all other relevant UN resolutions.66
B. ASEAN Counterterrorism Conventions
The diversity overcome through ASEAN’s very existence makes consensus
on a contentious subject such as a counter terrorism convention seem a lot less
daunting than it would be under other circumstances. In the ASEAN Convention
on Counter Terrorism (CCT) a framework is laid out for cooperation to prevent
and suppress terrorists by requiring each member state to work towards a
common law enforcement agenda.67 While the approach taken in the ASEAN
CCT seems to be very comprehensive, it maintains the identity of the “ASEAN
Way.”68 Each ASEAN nation has its own version of terrorism laws and maintains
the sovereign right to enforce those laws, ensuring that they do not suffer the
infringement on those rights by their neighbors.69 The difference between this
convention and previous ASEAN agreements is that the convention implies a
formal based approach, which molds the terrorism laws for all countries within
the region. Although not going so far as to entrust the regional organization with
the ability to address member’s deficiencies directly, it does require each nation
to work toward a common law enforcement agenda not only to counter but also
to prevent and suppress terrorists.70
The ASEAN CCT defines terrorism by detailing specific criminal offenses
when any action fits the scope of terrorism as defined in the fourteen United
Nations Conventions that address terrorism. 71 The exception to this being that
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no party to the convention will be held to task for those UN conventions defining
criminal offenses to which they are not a party.72 If a party withdraws from one
of the definitive treaties, they must declare that withdrawal and then are no
longer responsible for enforcing the criminal acts that are defined by that
specific convention.73 The definitions of a criminal offense are as significant as is
the oath to counter these criminal acts through current sovereign domestic laws
and the thirteen cooperative areas below:
1) Take the necessary steps to prevent the commission of terrorist
acts, including by the provision of early warning to the other Parties
through the exchange of information;
2) Prevent those who finance, plan, facilitate, or commit terrorist acts
from using their respective territories for those purposes against
the other Parties and/or the citizens of the other Parties;
3) Prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist acts;
4) Prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective
border control and controls on issuance of identity papers and
travel documents, and through measures for preventing
counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity papers and
travel documents;
5) Promote capacity‐building including trainings and technical
cooperation and the holding of regional meetings;
6) Promote public awareness and participation in efforts to counter
terrorism, as well as enhance inter‐faith and intra‐faith dialogue and
dialogue among civilizations;
7) Enhance cross‐border cooperation;
8) Enhance intelligence exchange and sharing of information;
9) Enhance existing cooperation towards developing regional
databases under the purview of the relevant ASEAN bodies;
10) Strengthen capability and readiness to deal with chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) terrorism, cyber terrorism
and any new forms of terrorism;
11) Undertake research and development on measures to counter
terrorism;
12) Encourage the use of video conference or teleconference facilities
for court proceedings, where appropriate; and
13) Ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning,
preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting
terrorist acts is brought to justice.74
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C. ASEAN Counterterrorism Declarations

Prior to the CCT there were twelve declarations or agreements made by
the ASEAN members in the pursuit of a comprehensive counter terrorism
agenda.75
The leaders of ASEAN applied the United Nations Charter,
International Law and all the relevant United Nations Resolutions or Declarations
on international terrorism, in particular the principles outlined in United Nations
Security Council Resolutions 1373 and 1566, when drafting these declarations.76
This history in the area of regional cooperation against terrorism in conjunction
with the global initiatives on counterterrorism is detailed in the 2001 ASEAN
Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism.77 This declaration was a
significant step in the post 9‐11 world to show the regions solidarity in the fight
against terrorism. Similar to the CCT, the 2001 declaration maintained a regional
persona by recognizing the sovereign equality, territorial integrity and non‐
75
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intervention in the domestic affairs of the individual states, but also affirmed
their commitment to counter, prevent and suppress all forms of terrorist acts.78
D. Regional Security Partnerships
As significant to ASEAN’s efforts to adhere to the UN Resolution 1373 by
entering into its own counter terrorism convention is the efforts that ASEAN has
made to participate with the nations external to the organization for the purpose
of counter terrorism in the region. ASEAN has been very successful in
developing forums with these external partners. Examples of these forums are
the ASEAN Regional Forum (twenty‐one countries including all major powers),
ASEAN Plus Three (China, Korea, and Japan), and ASEAN Plus One (China).79
ASEAN has also entered into several agreements in counter‐terrorism,
transnational crime or non‐traditional security threats with individual countries,
namely Australia (June 2004), China (November 2002), the European Union
(January 2003), India (October 2003), Japan (November 2004), the Russian
Federation (June 2004), and the United States (August 2002).80 The level of
participation of ASEAN members and external nations is a shining example of
success for the sovereignty focused, non‐confrontational style that is the ASEAN
Way.81 The organization has managed to sit successfully at the table with both
North and South Korea, the United States, and member nation Burma—parties
whom are not normally inclined to be in the same room, much less at the same
table.82
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The positive effects of cooperation amongst ASEAN states and external
partners are also evident in non‐binding relationships with inter‐state
institutions on security issues such as the United Nations’ Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and Financial Action Task Force
(FATF). Included in this are significant mechanisms to counter terrorism by
addressing the financial environment attractive to terrorists in the region.83
ASEAN recognizes the vital importance of these links in addressing the economic
vulnerabilities of the region that facilitate the terrorist agenda, and in particular
has cooperated both as a region and as individual states with the UN, OECD, and
FATF.84 The Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing provided by OECD
and the work of the Asia‐Pacific Group on Money Laundering provide the
framework to detect, prevent, and suppress the financing of global terrorism in
the region. By addressing the financing of terrorists and their money laundering
activities, Southeast Asian nations are taking away one of the key ingredients
that make this region susceptible to terrorists.
E. Proliferation Security Initiatives
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a multinational activity
directed at preventing the trafficking of weapons of mass destruction, their
means of delivery, and related materials to and from states and non‐state actors
of proliferation concern.85 It is a partnership of states working together to
develop a broad range of legal, diplomatic, economic, military, law enforcement,
and other tools to interdict shipments of WMD‐related items of proliferation
concern.86 There are ninety‐eight nations that have volunteered to become
participants in PSI.87 Along with the membership that includes a majority of the
global community, PSI has enjoyed the endorsement of the United Nations. The
UN High‐Level Panel of advisors said that all states should be encouraged to join
83

Paul Smith & Terry Klapakis, Executive Summary: Countering the Support Environment
for Terrorism in the Asia‐Pacific Region (31 Jan—2 Feb 2006), ASIA‐PAC. CTR. FOR SEC.
STUDIES,
http://www.apcss.org/college/conference/countering‐the‐support‐
environment‐for‐terrorism‐in‐the‐asia‐pacific‐region/ (last visited May 20, 2011).
84
See ASEAN, ASEAN‐EU Joint Declaration on Co‐operation to Combat Terrorism (Jan.
27–28, 2003), http://www.aseansec.org/14030.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2011)
(stressing the importance of cooperation with UN organizations and acknowledging the
complex problems associated with terrorist financial operations).
85
Media Note, U.S. Dep’t of State, Office of the Spokesman, Washington Declaration for
PSI 5th Anniversary Senior‐Level Meeting (May 28, 2008), available at
http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans‐
english/2008/May/20080529121217eaifas0.5970575.html&distid=ucs.
86
Id.
87
See Proliferation Security Initiative Participants (2010), U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF
INT’L SEC. AND NONPROLIFERATION, available at http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c27732.htm
(last visited Apr. 3, 2010) (listing the nations that are PSI participants).

2010–2011] Standing our Ground

89

this voluntary initiative.88 Referring to this advice, Mr. Kofi Annan, the former
Secretary‐General of the UN, applauded PSI as an effort to fill gaps in global
defenses against terrorism.89
In August 2004, ASEAN was represented by Cambodia, the Philippines,
Singapore, and Thailand at Japan’s PSI maritime interception exercise, where
their representatives took part as observers.90 In 2006, Singapore hosted the
first PSI exercise in Southeast Asia, and thirteen PSI core countries participated,
as well as observers from Malaysia, Pakistan, Vietnam, and Brunei.91 While most
ASEAN nations are playing an active role in the evolving function of PSI, some
members are still reluctant because of continued sovereignty concerns.92 As it
becomes more obvious that PSI will not infringe on the rights of these nations,
more nations can be expected to fully participate and all will be affected in some
way.
III. LEGISLATION AND ENFORCEMENT
Through the conventions, agreements, doctrines, and forums discussed
in this paper thus far, I have shown that ASEAN nations have agreed to
criminalize terrorism and take action against those who commit terrorist acts in
their region. Cooperation in the creation of these mechanisms is very evident;
the reality, however, is that no law, convention, treaty, or agreement can stop its
own violation. The success or failure of any legal framework is dependent on
whether it is accepted, applied, and enforced. Once the nations of Southeast
Asia agreed to the counter terrorism mechanisms, the individual nations needed
to take steps to provide law enforcement agencies the appropriate authority and
resources to capture, prosecute, and punish those that commit or support
terrorists.93 An effective measure of how post 9–11 law making has affected
terrorism is to look at the Philippines and Indonesia, home to JI, the MILF, and
ASG.94 These two island nations have taken great strides over the last six years
88
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to implement counter terrorism measures in accordance with the UN and
subsequent ASEAN conventions.95 The effect of these has not only strengthened
their security but also their regional and global relationships.96
A. The Republic of the Philippines
In November of 2001, George Bush, the President of the United States,
met with President Gloria Macapagal‐Arroyo of the Philippines at the White
House.97 Following this meeting, President Bush announced the U.S. support for
a united ASEAN and offered America’s assistance to ASEAN in their efforts to
combat transnational crimes including terrorism.98 The President also stated
that the fight against terrorism was parallel with the fight against poverty in the
region.99 The Philippines have taken advantage of the assistance offered by
other nations and non‐government organizations (NGO) and have used that
assistance to find some excellent success in both enacting laws that counter
terrorism and in enforcement efforts.100
1. An Executive Order for the Philippines
The significant legal basis for actions in the Philippines’ fight against
terrorism was initiated through President Arroyo’s Executive Order no. 265,
titled “Defining the Approach and Institutional Mechanism for the Governments
Comprehensive Program on Combating Transnational Crime.”101 Here, she cites
that the Philippines is a party to the United Nations Convention Against
Transnational Crime and the ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Organized
Crime, and states that the adherence to those agreements requires the
95
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Philippines to combat every aspect of transnational crime.102 She provided five
areas of focus for the execution of her order: (1) Strengthening information and
intelligence gathering, (2) Strategic research, (3) Intensifying law enforcement
operations, (4) Capacity building and empowerment for major stakeholders, and
(5) Reinforcing regional and international cooperation.103 Based on the
President’s guidance, the Philippines is operating against terrorism using a two
pronged approach. On one hand they are working with ASEAN partners
Malaysia and Indonesia, who monitor a diplomatic relationship with Moro
National Liberation Front (MNLF); and on the other hand they are actively
conducting operations, with the assistance of U.S. advisors, to track down and
capture or kill JI, MNLF, and ASG operators in the area.104
The relationship with the MNLF primarily affects focus areas four and
five—the capacity building and empowerment of major stakeholders and
reinforcement of regional cooperation. Terrorists in the Southern Philippines
have had an advantage in that the national government in Luzon is
predominantly Christian, leading to a benefit for recruitment and support.105 By
working with representatives from Indonesia and Malaysia, the Philippine
government has more credibility when sitting at the table with Islamic groups
that are concerned about the government having their best interests. The
Philippine government representatives pride themselves on twelve years of
peaceful process with the MNLF and views that peace as representative of
Christians and Muslims being able to live together in Mindanao. Malaysia
withdrew from the international monitoring team in 2008,106 however, the four
years that they spent working with the Philippine government continues to have
a significant impact on the government’s diplomatic relationship with
community leaders in the southern Philippine Islands.
2. External Partnerships for a Common Goal
There are a variety of U.S. resources dedicated to counterterrorism
assistance in the Philippines that reinforce President Arroyos focus’ areas. Some
examples of U.S. agencies that provide training and assistance are: The United
States Agency for International Development (USAID), which between 2001–
2008, provided approximately $345 million to reinforce Philippine Government
102

Id.
Id.
104
Schmitt, supra note 94.
105
See Religious Freedom Report 2004, U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy,
Human Rights, & Labor, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2004/35425.htm (discussing
the societal attitudes and conflicts between Muslims and Christians in the Philippines).
106
Joyce Pango Pa’ares, Manila Airs Regret, Relief Over Malaysia Withdrawal, MANILA
STANDARD
TODAY,
Apr.
28,
2008,
http://www.manilastandardtoday.com/2008/april/28/news1.htm.
103

92

U. MIAMI NAT’L SECURITY & ARMED CONFLICT L. REV. [Vol. 1

efforts to secure a lasting peace and build a better life for the people of
Mindanao;107 the Joint Special Operations Task Force Philippines (JSOTF‐P), a U.S.
military command focused on providing intelligence and training to their
Philippine counter‐parts, the FBI, CIA, and the DEA, who also provide training
and assistance to the Philippine military and intelligence agencies.108
President Arroyo’s fourth and fifth focus areas, capacity building and
empowerment for major stake‐holders, may be the lynchpin to success in the
Philippines war on terrorism. These focus areas are in sync with President Bush’s
statement paralleling the fight on poverty with the fight on terrorism and thus
are being assisted by USAID and JSOTF‐P. USAID participates by contracting civil
action projects using Philippine and, whenever possible, local contractors and
local labor.109 A few examples of the projects contracted by USAID include the
building of schools, foot bridges, medical facilities, rice and seaweed drying and
storing facilities, and wells.110 By focusing on local contractors and local labor,
USAID not only puts money into the local economy through the salaries of those
hired, but also provides a point of pride for the community in that they are
building their own future. USAID is also prepared to demobilize and help
transition 10,000 MILF soldiers back to civilian life when the organization enters
a peace accord with the national government.111 USAID had success with a
similar program in conjunction with the 1996 peace treaty between the MNLF
and the government.112 As stated earlier in this paper, the Philippine
government is proud that the 1996 treaty is still honored by both parties twelve
years later.
3. External Partnerships for a Common Goal
JSOTF‐P also plays a role in capacity building through its engineering
(ENCAP), medical (MEDCAP), dental (DENCAP), and veterinary (VETCAP) civic
action projects.113 The ENCAP’s are done by U.S. service members, Philippine
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service members, and normally some volunteers from the local communities.114
Projects have included the building of schools, medical centers, roads, and
wells.115 MEDCAPS also include both U.S. and Philippine Military medical
personnel, as well as local medical personnel and NGO’s if available. They treat
walk‐in sick call issues, provide some vaccines, diagnose problems for follow up
treatment, and sometimes perform minor surgery.116 DENCAPS, and VETCAPS,
are organized for similar missions for dentistry or veterinary purposes.117 Key to
the success of the JSOTF‐P mission is that an emphasis is placed on the Philippine
government representatives leading these missions and that they are out there
in front, so that the local people can see their government is trying to help them
and a provide a service for them.
JSOTF‐P also plays a large part in the law enforcement aspects of the
Philippine war on terrorism. The members of JSOTF‐P do not directly engage
terrorists, but they train and equip their Philippine counterparts with the
knowledge and expertise to get the mission done.118 Along with the training
provided by JSOTF‐P on tactics, six million dollars in night‐vision goggles, body
armor, helmets, and radios have helped intensify law enforcement operations.119
JSOTF‐P also provides intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets,
including P‐3 Orion maritime surveillance aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, and
satellite imagery.120 In addition, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia have
received $27 million dollars in coastal surveillance stations equipped with special
radar, heat detecting cameras, and computers.121 The Philippine National Police
Agencies and Military have used these additional tools in their kit bag to great
advantage. The Philippine government has killed or captured all major elements
of the ASG group in the last five years.122 An organization that had over 1,000
active organizers operating only a few years ago is now down to an estimated
200.123 The JI presence in the Philippines has all but disappeared and the group
has been ostracized by the MILF who see JI as a threat to continued peace
negotiations with the government.124 The success of the government in
communicating and enforcing laws has created a rift between local separatists
and international terrorists.125 International terrorists like JI and Al‐Qaeda are
114
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losing the battle in Southeast Asia and it is directly related to the initiative put
forth by the efforts ASEAN predicated on post‐9/11 UN conventions.
B. Indonesia
On November 9, 2008, the legal process for the three members of JI who
were convicted of terrorist acts in the Bali bombing came to an end when they
were executed a by firing squad on a prison island south of Java. Indonesia has
focused its counterterrorism efforts on enhancing the capabilities of their judicial
system and law enforcement. Extensive efforts in these areas have paid high
dividends over the past five years and make Indonesia a prime example of post‐
9/11 counter terrorism conventions succeeding.
1. The Judiciary
Indonesia’s courts have been effective in prosecuting over 200 JI
terrorists with links to Al‐Qaeda in the last three years.126 This success is based
on an evolving but effective legal and law enforcement environment that
supports the end state of counterterrorism.127 At the legal forefront of the fight
against terror in Indonesia is the U.S. government funded Attorney General’s
Task Force on Terrorism and Transnational Crime.128 In 2008, this team of
prosecutors has had some major convictions including: Zarkasih, the leader of JI
from 2005 until his arrest; Dujana, leader of JI’s military arm; Hasanuddin, a JI
leader; four men who participated in the 2005 schoolgirl beheadings; and three
others who were involved in the 2005 Tentena market bombings.129 In addition
to the terrorist actors themselves, the Indonesian government has prosecuted
thirty‐two persons for financial crimes that could be linked to terrorist
organizations, expanding the battle beyond the immediate fight.130
More significant in some ways than the convictions themselves is the
announcement by the Indonesian government in October 2008 that prisoners
with terrorist convictions will no longer receive remissions on major holidays.131
The Indonesian traditional practice of remissions or the early release of prisoners
during holidays had caused tension between Indonesia and the U.S. and
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Australia.132 In 2006, Abu Bakar Bashir, a terrorist associated with the Bali
Bombing, was released early to the dismay of the U.S. and Australia.133 Bashir
served just over a year for his part in the criminal conspiracy involved in the Bali
Bombing. In a turn of events the more recently captured Zarkasih and Dujana
were not so lucky; in April 2008 Zarkasih and Dujana were sentenced to 15 years
imprisonment.134 At home in Indonesia, JI members no longer enjoy the comfort
of leniency, as the judicial system begins to show some muscle in dealing with
terrorists.
While in prison, Indonesians convicted of terrorist acts have an
opportunity to reconcile with society. The Indonesian government has a
rehabilitation program for convicted terrorists serving time in prison.135 The
program singles out those terrorists that may be open to more moderate
teachings of Islam and the government works with them using mentorship type
program.136 The program provides spiritual support and education for the men,
as well as some financial support for their families.137 The results of this program
have been a decrease in the recruiting cadre for terrorists within the prison walls
and the receipt of some valuable intelligence for Indonesian counterterrorism
operations. 138
2. Serving Justice in Java
The people responsible for bringing terrorists to justice are the
counterterrorism law enforcement units of the Indonesian National Police
(POLRI).139 Based on the law enforcement initiatives of ASEAN convention on
counterterrorism and the UN conventions, a special police unit was created in
2002. The unit is titled Special Detachment 88 (SD‐88), and they are trained by
132
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the U.S. military, FBI, CIA, DEA, and Australian military/law enforcement
representatives.140 In researching this topic it was hard to find an article over
the last three years dealing with counter terrorism in Indonesia that did not
discuss the unit’s successes. This elite force, which receives much of its funding
for equipment and training from the U.S. government, has been the strong arm
of the law for the government of Indonesia in its fight against terrorism.141
Nearly all of the over 200 JI personnel captured or killed in the last few years
have been escorted out of their hiding places by SD‐88 members.142
Another unit that has not received as much notoriety as SD‐88, but that
might be as effective in eradicating terrorists from the region, is the officers of
the Financial Crimes Transaction and Analysis Center (PPATK). An organization
created in the aftermath of the Bali Bombing and 9‐11 in accordance with the
ASEAN initiatives to counter terrorism, PPATK has taken the battle to the
terrorist’s wallet.143 PPATK receives information on suspicious transactions from
financial institutions throughout Indonesia and investigates for potential terrorist
financing schemes.144 They currently receive almost 500 reports of suspicious
transactions a month and have been responsible for the arrest and prosecution
of 32 individuals.145
3. Partnership from Down Under and Uncle Sam
The ASEAN convention on counterterrorism encouraged its members to
work with outside nations toward the goal of defeating terrorists in the
region.146 Indonesia has benefited significantly from one such relationship with
Australia. The Australians have been working to develop an expanded program
of assistance in close cooperation with the Indonesian Government. They have
assisted in the building of counterterrorism programs in three key areas: (1)
140
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enhancing the capacity of the Indonesian National Police (POLRI); (2) travel
security; and (3) combating terrorist financing.147 To this end Australia has
contributed an estimated $100 million dollars to the Indonesians to fight
terrorism, including the establishment of the $50 million Jakarta Centre for Law
Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) to enhance bilateral and regional goals to
counter terrorism and $7 million for the Transnational Crime Centre (TNCC) to
provide a focal point within POLRI for prevention, identification and dismantling
all forms of transnational crime, including terrorism.148 The Australians also
provide sophisticated electronic surveillance capabilities, assist in monitoring
telephone traffic, and the training of lawyers and prosecutors.149
Taking a similar stance to its assistance in the Philippines, the U.S.
government, in addition to its counter terrorism law enforcement and legislative
assistance, has provided $157 million in education assistance.150 This assistance
seems to follow the same train of thought that President Bush had when
discussing the Philippines, in that we need to fight the war against poverty
parallel with the fight against terrorists.151 Each time a terrorist is captured and
brought to justice a battle is won; however, these battles are insignificant if steps
are not taken to also educate people and address poverty in this region.
4. Neighborhood Watch
External partnerships are not the only resource being tapped by the
Indonesian government. In July 2004, they initiated Operation MALSINDO along
with Singapore and Malaysia.152 This operation consists of trilateral coordinated
patrols to counter the threats of maritime terrorism and piracy in the Strait of
Malacca.153 Each of the countries involved has committed themselves to sharing
information and providing maritime and aviation assets to patrol the strait. Since
147
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the operation began, piracy has dropped significantly in the Strait and security
against terrorists has been enhanced.154
If the number of terrorists captured and prosecuted, the drop in pirate
activities, or the level of cooperation between Indonesia and its regional and
international partners in the fight against terrorism are not enough there is one
other statistic that may convince observers that the war against terrorism is
successful tourism. In 2007 Bali saw a thirty‐two percent rise in tourism and
Indonesia saw an overall fifteen percent rise.155 This symbolizes people’s belief
that it is once again a safe place to visit and enjoy the beach.
V. CONCLUSION
ASEAN’s compliance with UN counter terrorism conventions has been
successful because of new laws, legal training and strong relationships between
member states and the international community. New laws like the ASEAN
counter terrorism convention and the ASEAN counterterrorism declarations have
been a beacon to the individual states in their own counterterrorism initiatives,
while legal training including every aspect of the law from legislation to law
enforcement, and then the courtroom has been critical to execution.
Multiplying the effectiveness of legislation and training have been the
relationships with other members of ASEAN, multiple forums, and relationships
with individual nations outside of the region.
A positive picture has been painted depicting the battle against terrorism
in Southeast Asia, but much of this success on the ground, particularly in the
Philippines, has been enabled by positive nation building efforts. There will
always be a threat of terrorism while a large percentage of the population lives
in abject poverty. The socio‐economic level of the public will continue to provide
a breeding ground of terrorism for those who can manipulate it. This makes
more education and economic reform essential to keeping terrorists at bay in
this or any region.
Clearly however the ASEAN counter terrorism convention, and the ASEAN
counterterrorism declarations have been a success in providing the critical
framework to enable the cooperation and actions necessary to counter terrorist
activity. As a direct result of these initiatives Southeast Asia is a model of
flexibility that can be applied to other regions that do not have the rigid
structure and reliance on regionalism over sovereignty. It is a style very different
from that of the European Union, but one that can be very applicable in Africa,
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Latin America, or the Middle East. ASEAN has shown that maintaining a focus on
sovereignty does not equate to a lack of regional or international cooperation.
Contrary to some western views this region and it’s concept of the “ASEAN Way”
has proven to be flexible and effective in countering terrorist threats. As
terrorists continue to evolve, Southeast Asia is prepared to evolve in ways that
will counter new threats.

“The governments out here take it very seriously and, in my opinion, seem to be
doing a very good job individually and working together to deal with that
terrorist threat.”
U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
June 1, 2008 (referring to Southeast Asia)

